Abstract-In this paper, we consider the design of a new secure transmission scheme for a four-node relay-eavesdropper channel, where user cooperation is used to facilitate secure communications. The key idea of the proposed achievable scheme is to apply the compression relaying concept of noisy network coding (NNC) to the secrecy communication scenario. But different from the original non-secrecy NNC, the compression rate at the relay is adaptively chosen according to the eavesdropping channel. Particularly, helping interference information is injected into the compression codebook at the relay by simply enlarging the compression rate, which is to effectively suppress the eavesdropping channel. Closed-form expressions of the secrecy rates achieved by the proposed NNC-based secure scheme are characterized for both the discrete memoryless and Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channels, where the optimal compression rate and the optimal transmit power at the relay are also determined. The proposed secure scheme can be viewed as a general framework, which naturally combines the NNC compression relaying scheme with the interference-assisted scheme. Analytical and numerical results demonstrate that the proposed secure scheme offers constant performance gains over typical existing cooperative secure schemes.
propagation, wireless transmissions can be over-heard by multiple unintended receivers. Such broadcasting nature facilitates cooperation by allowing neighbor users to intelligently exploit the over-heard information, but also leads to a serious security problem such as eavesdropper attacking. This paper illustrates how user cooperation can be used to assist secrecy in wireless communications.
Wyner introduced the wire-tap channel in [2] from an information theoretic aspect. Under the assumption that the eavesdropping channel (i.e., the source-eavesdropper channel) is a degraded version of the main channel (i.e., the sourcedestination channel), the secrecy capacity was established based on the rate-equivocation region concept. Csiszár and Körner extended this degraded channel to the general wiretapper channel setup without any special assumptions, and found the secrecy capacity in [3] . In the past ten years, the approach of the information-theoretical secrecy has been applied to more types of multiuser networks. The multiple access channel (MAC) is considered in [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . For the broadcast channel (BC), the works in [9] [10] [11] [12] investigate the BC with confidential messages where both receivers wish to keep their message secret from the others, while [13] introduces a three-receiver broadcast channel with two intended receivers and an eavesdropper. Furthermore, [9] , [14] , [15] consider the interference channel (IC), where [9] treats each unintended receiver as an eavesdropper and [14] , [15] introduce an external eavesdropper. The design of secure transmissions in relay channels is considered in [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , where the works in [16] and [17] consider the cases with an untrusted relay and the works in [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] consider the existence of an external eavesdropper. In [21] and [22] , the addressed wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI) can be viewed as a special case of the relay-eavesdropper (R-E) channel in [18] , where the relay node does not forward any source information, but just transmits artificial interference.
User cooperation has been recognized as an effective technique to enhance security levels in wireless communication networks. Secrecy cooperation strategies can be broadly categorized as decode-and-forward (DF), amplify-andForward (AF), compress-and-forward (CF), and deaf cooperation. The DF scheme requires the relay to decode the source message whose performance mainly relays on the source-relay channel (e.g., [19] , [20] , [25] [26] [27] ). The AF scheme arranges the relay node to scale and retransmit the received signal (e.g., [25] , [28] [29] [30] ). Deaf cooperation arranges the relay to send interference (or pure noise) which is independent of the source message in order to confuse the eavesdropper (e.g., [4] , [18] , [21] , [22] , [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] ). Deaf cooperation schemes can be broadly categorized as noise forward (NF) and cooperative jamming (CJ). The NF scheme in [18] arranges the relay to send independent messages which can be canceled by the intended receiver but would confuse the eavesdropper; the CJ scheme in [4] arranges the relay to send pure noise which would hurt the eavesdropping channel more than it hurts the main channel. Note that the interference assisted (IA) scheme in [21] generalizes both the NF and CJ schemes: when the coding rate of the interference codebook is large, the IA scheme reduces to the CJ scheme in [4] ; when the coding rate of the interference codebook is lower than a certain rate such that the intended receiver can decode and cancel the interference, this IA scheme reduces to the NF scheme in [18] . In addition, only a few existing works have investigated the security performance of the CF scheme (e.g., [8] , [12] , [18] ), and these works are all based on the conventional compression scheme with Wyner-Ziv binning [34] .
In this paper, we consider the R-E channel with a source, a relay, a destination and an eavesdropper. The key idea of our achievable scheme is to combine noisy network coding (NNC) 1 [35] with helping interference for secure communication. The proposed secure scheme is motivated by the observation that dummy messages can be easily injected into the NNC-based compression codebook at the relay by simply enlarging the compression rate, such that the eavesdropping channel can be effectively suppressed. Therefore, the proposed secure scheme is a general framework, which naturally combines the NNC compression relaying scheme with the IA scheme, and a few existing works, such as the non-secrecy NNC scheme in [35] and the IA scheme in [21] , can be viewed as special cases of this framework. Then, the closed-form expression of the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed secure scheme is characterized for the discrete memoryless (DM) R-E channel by analyzing the impact of the compression rate at the relay on the eavesdropping capability, where the optimal compression rate is also determined. When the relaydestination channel gain is strong, it is shown that the proposed NNC-based secure scheme can exploit the capability of the dedicated relay node more effectively, which can strengthen the main channel and suppress the eavesdropping channel at the same time.
In addition, we extend the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed NNC-based secure transmission scheme to the Gaussian R-E channel based on Gaussian codebooks. Fixed power control is first used to obtain an explicit expression of the achievable rate, and then the optimal transmit power at the relay is analyzed for a given transmit power at the source. It can be shown that the proposed NNC-based secure scheme is optimal and capacity-achieving when the relaydestination channel gain exceeds a certain threshold and the transmit power of the relay is sufficiently large. The achievable 1 The NNC scheme, introduced in [35] , is a type of the compression relaying scheme. Different to the classical CF scheme in [34] , the basic idea of NNC is that a source message is sent multiple times in multiple blocks using independent codebooks, and the compression index of the relay observations is sent without Wyner-Ziv binning.
secrecy rate of the Gaussian R-E channel is also applied to an example of the fading R-E channel, where an average achievable secrecy rate is derived. Finally, the provided numerical results for both the Gaussian and fading R-E channels demonstrate that the proposed NNC-based scheme enjoys a constant performance over typical existing cooperative secure schemes in most scenarios.
At this point, we wish to differentiate the proposed secure scheme from earlier relevant works.
• Three main differences can be summarized between this work and its conference version in [1] . First, the work in [1] has only conjectured the expression of the secrecy rate achieved by applying NNC to the R-E channel, where no derivation details were provided for a crucial step, i.e., "equivocation computation"; whereas this work obtains the closed-formed expression of the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed NNC-based secure scheme based on rigorous and non-trivial derivations for "equivocation computation". Second, unlike the work in [1] that didn't solve any optimization problems, the optimal compression rate R 2 and the optimal transmit power at the relay are determined in this paper for the DM and Gaussian R-E channels, respectively, and the expression of the achievable secrecy rate is simplified accordingly.
Third, compared to the work in [1] , this work provides the analytical and numerical results not only for the R-E Gaussian channel but also for the fading R-E channel.
• There exist three main differences between the proposed secure scheme and the original non-secrecy NNC scheme in [35] . First, we extend the original NNC scheme to the R-E channel by randomizing the codebook at the source based on the random binning technique in [2] , in order to confuse the eavesdropper. Second, the original NNC scheme chose the compression rate (denoted as R 2 ) to be close to its lower bound such that the main channel can be strengthened, whereas R 2 in the proposed secure scheme is chosen adaptively according to the eavesdropping channel, which may be significantly larger than its lower bound to confuse the eavesdropper. Third, the original NNC scheme in [35] utilized a "joint" decoding strategy at the destination, whereas the proposed scheme enables the destination to dynamically switch between the "joint" decoding and the separated decoding (i.e., treating the relay's signal as pure noise) strategies according to the value of R 2 . These differences also make this work and the work in [35] fundamentally different in the derivations of the achievable secrecy/non-secrecy rates.
• The explicit impact of compression relaying schemes on the secrecy rate of the R-E channel is still an open issue. For example, based on the classical CF scheme, the work in [18] utilized two steps at the relay to compress the received signal and insert randomness into the compression codebook, respectively, and only a rough lower bound of the achievable secrecy rate could be obtained in [18, Th. 4] , which couldn't even outperform the NF scheme with a "deaf" helper in [18] . However, the proposed NNC-based scheme enables the relay to insert randomness into the compression codebook by simply enlarging the compression rate R 2 , and the achievable secrecy rate can be derived with a closedform expression, which can be proved to significantly outperform the deaf cooperation schemes in [18] and [21] .
• The work in [29] enabled the relay to switch between the AF and CJ schemes. However, both the main and eavesdropping channels will be strengthened (or suppressed) when the AF (or CJ) scheme is performed. Compared to the AF/CJ scheme in [29] , the proposed secure scheme can strengthen the main channel and suppress eavesdropping channel simultaneously by injecting randomness into the compression codebook at the relay, and thus achieve a larger secrecy rate.
• The work in [26] combined the DF and CJ schemes to strengthen the main channel and suppress eavesdropping channel simultaneously, based on a strong assumption that a priori knowledge of the jamming signal was shared by source and the cooperative jammer (but not by the eavesdropper). However, our work does not consider such a strong assumption, and the eavesdropper has the same prior knowledge as the other nodes. This paper investigates secure communication from the perspective of information theoretic secrecy, where an ideal coding scheme is designed at the legitimate nodes for secure transmission, while the eavesdropper is assumed to enjoy the optimal eavesdropping strategy and unlimited computational power. However, recent works also paid much attention to practical designs of secure communication in a variety of system models, such as the design of an advanced filter at the eavesdropper in [36] and the design of a code-frequency block group coding scheme in [37] .
The reminder of the paper is organized as following. Section II describes the addressed R-E channel model. Section III states the achievable rate of the proposed secrecy transmission scheme and its proof steps. Section IV provides the extension of the secrecy rate to the Gaussian R-E channel, where the impact of the power control will also be discussed. Numerical results and Conclusions are given in Sections V and VI, respectively. Throughout this paper, (x) + denotes max(0, x). A sequence of random variables with time index
In addition, we define C(x) 1 2 log(1 + x), and the expectation of a random variable X is denoted as E(X).
II. THE RELAY-EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
As shown in Fig. 1 , consider a DM R-E channel with a source
and a passive eavesdropper (Y 2 ). This communication model consists of two finite input alphabets X 1 , X 2 at the source and relay respectively, three output alphabets Y r , Y 1 , Y 2 at the relay, destination and eavesdropper respectively, and a channel transition probability distribution p(y r , y 1 , y 2 |x 1 , x 2 ) where x t ∈ X t , y t ∈ Y t (t = 1, 2) and y r ∈ Y r . The source wishes to send a confidential message W 1 to the destination with the help of the dedicated relay, while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper which knows the codebooks of the source and relay.
The source intends to send a confidential message W 1 ∈ {1, · · · , M} to the destination in n channel uses. The memoryless assumption is imposed in the sense that at the i -th channel use the channel outputs (y r,i , y 1,i , y 2,i ) only depend on the channel inputs (x 1,i , x 2,i ). A stochastic encoder for the source is specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities f 1 (x n 1 |w 1 ), where x n 1 ∈ X n 1 , w 1 ∈ W 1 and
The encoder at the relay maps the observations (y r,1 , y r,2 , · · · , y r,i−1 ) received before the i -th channel use to its output x 2,i , using another stochastic encoder f 2 , which is described by a matrix of conditional probabilities
The decoding function at the destination is described by a deterministic mapping φ:
The average error probability of a (M, n) code is
The secrecy level at the eavesdropper is measured with respect to the equivocation rate
. A secrecy rate R s is said to be achievable for the R-E channel if for any > 0 there exists a sequence of codes (M, n) such that
e ≤ , and
for a sufficiently large n.
III. AN ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
In this section we will present an achievable scheme for the R-E channel, whose key idea is to apply the concept of NNC [35] to the secrecy communication scenario. The secrecy rate achieved by the proposed secrecy scheme is given in the following subsection.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Prior to the discussions of the achievable rate, we first give some definitions as:
where (t = 1, 2), and R
(t )
1 is defined as a function of R 2 as R (t )
Note that R 2 in [35] is always close to I 1 , but R 2 in the proposed secure scheme may be significantly larger than I 1 , so we consider a range R 2 ≥ I 1 here. Then our achievable secrecy rate is given by the following theorem. Theorem 1: The achievable secrecy rate R s for the addressed R-E channel is
for a given joint distribution which is defined as
Proof: The basic idea of the achievable scheme will be described in the next, and the proof details will be provided later in Section III-D.
To achieve the secrecy rate given in Theorem 1, the source and the relay cooperate with each other based on the idea of the NNC scheme, and the necessary randomness will be inserted into the codebooks at both two transmitters. Roughly speaking, a message is first generated at the source by mixing the confidential message with a random dummy message, where the redundant dummy part (with rate R (2) 1 ) provides randomization to ensure the confidential part transmitted under the secrecy constraint. Then the source encodes this mixed message and sends it multiple times in multiple blocks using independent codebooks, which is different to the classical CF scheme in which a source message is first divided into multiple segments and then transmitted over multiple blocks. Meanwhile, at each block, the relay uses the NNC strategy without Wyner-Ziv binning to send the quantized observations obtained from the previous block. A key idea of the proposed secrecy scheme is to treat R 2 (the compression rate) as a parameter, where the helping interference is generated at the same time when the source message is compressed at the relay via the random covering process, and the amount of randomness injected into the compression codebook can be easily adjusted by enlarging R 2 .
For decoding, the destination performs either the "joint" decoding according to NNC or the separated decoding. Specifically, when
, the destination performs the "joint" decoding according to NNC, which simultaneously decodes the received signals from all the blocks without decoding the compression indices, so that the first term in the max function of R
2 − R 2 can be achieved.
, the destination performs separate decoding which aims to decode the source message by treating the signal transmitted by the relay as pure noise, so that the second term in the max function of R
1 (R 2 ), i.e., I (X 1 ; Y 1 ), can be achieved.
Remark 1: For the proposed relaying scheme, the relay transmits a compressed version of the received signal to the destination, so the noise received by the relay will be propagated to the destination. Classical compression relaying schemes without secrecy constraints aim to mitigate noise propagation using ideal coding strategies from an informationtheoretic perspective (e.g., [34] , [35] ). However, for the considered secrecy communication, noise propagation caused by the NNC scheme will affect not only the destination but also the eavesdropper. For example, when the compression rate R 2 at the relay is sufficiently large, the signal transmitted by the relay can only be regarded as pure noise at both the destination and eavesdropper, and the proposed NNC-based secure scheme reduces to the CJ scheme in [4] . Therefore, the key issue is to take advantage of the interference or the noise at the relay, rather than avoid them.
B. Optimal Compression Rate R 2
As shown in Theorem 1, it is important to determine the optimal value of R 2 to maximize the achievable secrecy rate.
From (4), one can observe that the function R
is a three-segmented decreasing function, where the first and the third segments are constant, whereas the middle segment decreases as R 2 increases with a slop of −1. The middle segment intersects with the first and the third segments at two intersections; based on (4), the two values of R 2 regarding to such two intersections can be calculated as follows:
2,1 ), no interference is involved in the signal transmitted from the relay to the destination (or the eavesdropper); when R
2,2 ), the interference is injected into the source-message-carrying signal transmitted from the relay to the destination (or the eavesdropper); when
2,2 ), the signal transmitted by the relay can only be regarded as pure noise at the destination (or the eavesdropper).
Due to the three-segmented form of R (t ) 1 (R 2 ), we only need to focus on two candidate values of R 2 in order to obtain the maximum difference between R (1)
2,1 which represents the critical value for R (1) 1 to remain in the first segment (with the maximum value, i.e., R
, and the second one is R (2) 2,2 which represents the critical value for the rate of the eavesdropper channel (i.e., R (2) 1 ) to reach to the third segment (with the minimum value, i.e., R (2)
. Using these two candidate values of R 2 , we can obtain the following lemma regarding to a simplified expression of the achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Given the joint distribution in (6), the achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 1 can be simplified as follows:
where
2,2 . Proof: We first prove this lemma conditioned on R
2,2 ≥ I 1 . As aforementioned, the optimal value of R 2 should be either R
2,2 ≥ I 1 is satisfied. Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate R s in Theorem 1 can be expressed as 
2,2 and R
Now, we will consider three cases regarding to R
(1)
2,2 , respectively. 
2,1 , and
2,1 , the expression of R s can be unified to (9) . Similar to the aforementioned discussions, this lemma can also be proved when R
2,2 < I 1 , whose details are omitted here for simplicity.
Remark 3: In Lemma 1, R I s corresponds to the scheme that the signal transmitted by the relay does not interfere both the destination and the eavesdropper, so that both the main channel and the eavesdropping channel can be strengthened. In addition, R I I s corresponds to the scheme that the signal transmitted by the relay can only be regarded as pure noise at the eavesdropper, so that the eavesdropping channel can be maximally suppressed; however, the destination would benefit from or be affected less by the signal transmitted by the relay.
C. Special Cases
In this subsection, we will present several special cases of Theorem 1.
1) Disable the Channel Output Y 2 :
If we disable the received signal Y 2 at the eavesdropper by setting Y 2 = Ø, Theorem 1 reduces to the rate achieved by the NNC scheme for the classical relay channel without security constraints [35] , i.e.,
for a given joint distribution in (6).
2) Disable the Channel Output Y r :
If we disable the received signal Y r at the relay by setting Y r = Ø, the channel model reduces to WT-HI in [21] , and the achievable secrecy rate becomes
Remark 4: The proposed secure scheme generalizes the IA scheme in [21] , and thus generalizes the NF scheme in [18] and the CJ scheme in [4] as discussed in Section I.
3) Very Strong Eavesdropping: Similar to [21] , we define the very strong eavesdropping channel as
, which means that the eavesdropping channel is so strong that the main channel is weaker than the noise-corrupted eavesdropping channel. For such very strong eavesdropping channel, the IA scheme in [21] cannot achieve a positive secrecy rate. However, based on Lemma 1 and the facts that
, the secrecy rate of the proposed scheme can be expressed as:
for a given joint distribution in (6) . (12), respectively. Fig. 3 shows the achievable secrecy rate R s for these three cases, which is illustrated by the difference between the rates of the main channel (R . From Lemma 1, we know that the optimal value of R 2 should be R * 2 = max{I 1 , R
2,2 } for the very strong eavesdropping channel. Note that two sub-cases are involved in case i :
2,2 and
2,2 ; whereas cases ii and iii only correspond to I 1 ≤ R (2) 2,2 and
2,2 , respectively. The use of the channel prefixing technique in [3] may further enhance the performance of the proposed scheme, but 
2,2 }, and R
2,2 is defined in (8) .
we do not consider this prefixing method in this paper due to the intractable evaluation of its performance.
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Codebook Generation:
. A codebook for each block is randomly and independently generated. Let
For each j ∈ [1 : B], randomly generate 2 n B R 1 n-sequences
. These 2 n B R 1 codewords are then randomly grouped into 2 n B R 1,s bins each with 2 n B R 1,d codewords, 2 
). Hence the codebook is defined as
, (l 0 = 1). In addition, set the rates for R 1 and R 2 as
2 Note that the parameters R 1 ,
where I 1 and I
Encoding: The encoding processes at the source and relay are shown as follows:
• To send the confidential message w 1 ∈ [1 : 2 n B R 1,s ], the source randomly chooses a dummy message w 1 ∈ [1 : 2 n B R 1,d ] and then sends x 1 j (w 1 , w 1 ) at block j . Meanwhile, the relay transmits x 2 j (l j −1 ) in block j .
• The relay, upon the received sequence y r j at the end of block j , finds an index l j such that
. If there exists more than one such qualified index, uniformly select one of them at random. Besides, if there doesn't exist such an index, randomly choose an arbitrary index from
Decoding: Let > . At the end of block B, the destination will perform either the joint decoding according to NNC or the separate decoding. Specifically, 1) when
2,1 , the destination performs the "joint" decoding according to NNC, which declares thatŵ 1 is received if
2,1 , the destination performs the separate decoding, which declares thatŵ 1 is received if
for all j ∈ [1 : B]. The destination makes an error if neither 1) nor 2) occurs, or if there exists more than one suchŵ 1 
is subjected to the constraint in Section III of [35] or the constraint of separate decoding. Therefore, the intended receiver can decode W 1 with an arbitrarily small probability of error using either the "joint" decoding strategy according to NNC or the separate decoding, as long as n and B are sufficiently large. The analysis details are omitted here due to space limitation. Equivocation Computation: The parameter R 1,d is depending on the compression rate R 2 at the relay. From (4) and the perspective of the eavesdropper, if
2,2 , we denote Case I and Case II as the cases that
2,2 , respectively. Note that Case I corresponds to the situation R (2)
2 − R 2 , and Case II corresponds to the situation R
2,2 , Case I does not exist, and we only need to consider Case II. In the following, we only consider the situation that
2,2 is trivial. Now the equivocation will be lower bounded according to the value of R 2 as the following two cases.
A) Case I
In this case, set the rate parameter for R 1,d as
In the following analysis,
So are the definitions with respect to the other variables such as X 2 , Y 2 ,Ŷ r . The equivocation at the eavesdropper is lower bounded as
Now let's calculate the six terms separately as follows.
1) The First and the Second Terms:
2) The Third Term: Since a block Markov encoding is used, and
In order to obtain the lower bound of H (L B |L B−1 ), let's first present a lemma as following.
Lemma 2: For any j ∈ [1 : B] and l j −1 , l j ∈ [1 :
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Therefore, by using the above lemma, H (L j |L j −1 ) can be bounded as
where δ 1 (n, ) is defined as
which goes to 0 as n → ∞ since R 2 has been constrained in (13) . Recalling (15), we can obtain
3) The Fourth and Fifth Terms: The fourth term in (17) can be upper bounded as:
where (a) follows removing conditioning and the fact that the second term in (21) is zero since X n 2 j is a deterministic function ofŶ n r, j −1 , X 2, j −1 ; (b) follows the fact thatŶ n r j − {X
and the channel is memoryless. Besides, the fifth term can be upper bounded as follows:
where (a) follows from the fact that Y n
n r] j [ } is a Markov chain. Using the above two results, we can bound the sum of above two terms as follows:
On the other hand,
Therefore, we have
where R 1,d is defined in (14). 
4) The Last Term: Now let's bound the last term H (X
where (a) is based on the following lemma. Lemma 3: For Case I, the average error probability λ(w 1 , l B ) satisfies: λ(w 1 , l B ) ≤ δ 4 (n) as long as (14) is satisfied, where δ 4 (n) is arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. Thus the last term can be bounded as
By combining (15) with (16), (20), (22) and (24), we get
By letting B → ∞, the equivocation is approaching to the secrecy rate.
This proof can be completed by following the similar steps in Case I and [21] . First the rate parameter for R 1,d is chosen as
To prove the rate for CASE II, the relay uses a similar binning procedure as the source. For each j ∈ [1 : B], the 2 n R 2 codewords are randomly grouped into 2 n R 2 bins each with 2 n R 2 codewords, hence R 2 = R 2 + R 2 . So that the index of each codeword can be equivalently expressed as
To simplify the proof, we set
Then following the steps in (15) 
and let (L )
where (20) . The second term can be bounded as
Besides, from (22) , the sum of the fourth and the fifth terms can be expressed as
To bound the last term 2 ) constrained in (13), (26) and (27) , it can be shown that the error probability is arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n. Hence we have
Substituting the above results into (28), the equivocation can be bounded as
Again by letting B → ∞, we can show that the equivocation is approaching the secrecy rate.
IV. GAUSSIAN RELAY-EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
In this section, a Gaussian R-E channel is considered, and the result of the achievable secrecy rate will be applied in a fading channel model.
A. An Equivalent Gaussian Relay-Eavesdropper Channel
For the considered Gaussian R-E channel, the channel outputs at the destination, eavesdropper, relay are given bỹ
where Z 1 , Z 2 , Z r are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random variables with unit variance; h α,β is the channel gain from node α to node β, where α ∈ {s, r }, α, β ∈ {r, d, e}, and nodes s, r , d, e denote the source, the relay, the destination and the eavesdropper, respectively. In addition, each h α,β is assumed to be a positive real number in this subsection, and the model with complex channel gains will be considered at the last subsection of this section. The transmit power of the channel inputsX 1 andX 2 are constrained by
Similar to the scaling transformation in [4] , we can represent any R-E channel by an equivalent form
, whose power constraints become toP
and a, b, c are the equivalent channel gains, which can be expressed as
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Applying Theorem 1 to the Gaussian R-E channel given by (33) , the following theorem can be obtained.
Theorem 2: For a Gaussian R-E channel, when fixing the transmit powers at the source and relay as 0 ≤ P 1 ≤P 1 and 0 ≤ P 2 ≤P 2 , the following secrecy rate is achievable
, and R I I s (P 1 , P 2 ) is given in (37) , as shown at the top of the next page.
Proof: This theorem can be proved based on Lemma 1 with the optimal compression rate and the design of Gaussian codebooks, whose proof details will be provided in Appendix C.
Remark 5: It can be easily proved that R I s ≤ [C(P 1 ) − C(a P 1 )] + for the Gaussian R-E channel as shown in Theorem 2, where R I s corresponds to the scheme that the signal transmitted by the relay does not interfere both the destination and the eavesdropper as discussed in Remarks 2 and 3. This implies that the secrecy rate achieved by the scheme without interference cannot even outperform the direct transmission without the relay node, and thus helping interference at the relay plays an important role for improving the secrecy rate.
Remark 6: As shown in (37) , when b ≥ 1 + (1 + c)P 1 , P 2 → ∞, and (P 1 , P 2 ) = (P 1 ,P 2 ), the achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 2 can achieve the upper bound C(1 + cP 1 ), which is an upper bound of the Gaussian relay channel without security constraints [34] . This means that the proposed secure
scheme is optimal and capacity-achieving when the relaydestination channel gain is larger than a certain threshold and the transmit power of relay is sufficiently large. For the Gaussian R-E channel, the achievable secrecy rate is affected by R 2 and the transmit powers (P 1 and P 2 ). Theorem 2 has used the optimal value of R 2 based on Lemma 1, while power control can be used to further enhance the achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 2. Note that the secrecy rate is not necessarily maximized at P 1 =P 1 and P 2 =P 2 . Loosely speaking, in some situations, larger source power P 1 and relay power P 2 may enhance the eavesdropper's decoding capability more, or bring more interferences to the destination. Or in other words, the maximum power transmission does not always result in a larger equivocation rate. Then power control can play an important role for secrecy transmission and change the achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 2 into
where R I s is redundant and can be ignored when power control is applied since it cannot exceed R I I s with setting P 2 = 0. It is difficult to obtain the closed-form expression of the optimal solution for problem (38) , since the objective is nonconvex and involves a very complicated expression as shown in (37) . However, the following lemma shows that we can obtain the optimal value of P 2 for a given P 1 , which can significantly reduce the complexity to solve this problem.
Lemma 4: For a given P 1 , the optimal value of P 2 can be obtained as (1 − b) ;
where P 2,0 is given by
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. Remark 7: From Lemma 4, one can observe that the relay is active only when the R-E channel (i.e., b) is sufficiently strong or week. In particular, when b is large, the relay will send a coded mixed message consisting of the compressed source information and a random interference information, such that the destination can decode this mixed message while the eavesdropper cannot. When b is small, similar to [4] , the relay acts as a jammer that sends a pure noise.
Remark 8: Based on Lemma 4, we can only rely on a one-dimensional search to find the optimal value of P 1 , such that the optimal solution of problem (38) can be solved.
C. An Example Application
In this section, the results established for the Gaussian memoryless model will be applied to a fading R-E channel.
For the fading R-E channel, the received signals at the relay, legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are the same as those in (31) except that each channel gain and each noise become complex Gaussian variables. In addition, block fading channel model is assumed, where the channel gains remain unchanged within one time block and change independently at the beginning of the next block. Furthermore, each transmission is assumed to span over one fading block.
A short-term power constraint is considered in this channel model, i.e., the transmit powers at the source and the relay are constrained byP 1 andP 2 , respectively, within each fading block [31] . Based on Section IV-A and Section IV-B, an average achievable secrecy rate can be summarized as follows:
where we define H {H α,β } α∈{s,r},β∈{r,d,e} with H α,β |h α,β | 2 , the function P * 2 (P 1 , H) is given in Lemma 4, and the other parameters are defined as
Note that a long-term power constraint refers to the average power constraint over a sufficiently large number of fading blocks [25] , and the power allocation scheme for each block is more complicated, which could be an interesting future research topic.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, some numerical examples will be provided to illustrate the performance of the Gaussian and fading R-E channels using the proposed achievable scheme as well as some benchmark schemes. The additive white complex Gaussian noise at each receiver is assumed to be zero mean and unit variance, and hence the transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is equal to the transmit power at the source or the relay. Denote the transmit SNR constraints at the source and the relay as SNR 1 and SNR 2 , respectively, where
Moreover, the secrecy rate is measured by the unit of bits per channel use (BPCU).
A. Benchmark Schemes
Some benchmark schemes are considered in this section as follows:
1) DF Scheme: The DF scheme was proposed in [18] , where the relay was required to decode the source messages and the transmitted signals at the source and the relay are partially correlated. Obviously, the secrecy rate achieved by this DF scheme is dominated by the source-relay channel gain.
2) AF/CJ Scheme: The work in [29] investigated the optimal power allocation schemes both the AF and CJ schemes. In particular, the AF/CJ scheme in [29] enables the relay to switch between these two schemes, where the AF scheme is to strengthen the main channel while the CJ scheme is to suppress the eavesdropping channel.
3) IA Scheme: It has been mentioned in Section I that the IA scheme in [21] generalizes the NF and CJ schemes in [4] and [18] , respectively. Thus, this scheme is adopted as a benchmark scheme in this section.
4) Direct Transmission:
To highlight the effect of the relay in improving the secrecy rate, direct transmission without the relay is also adopted as a benchmark scheme.
5) Joint Upper Bound:
Note that a tight upper bound on the R-E channel is till an open issue. In this section, we utilize a joint upper bound, which is based on the upper bound in [19, Th. 3] , and the upper bound of the relay channel without secrecy constraints in [34] .
B. Gaussian R-E Channel
This subsection provides numerical results for the Gaussian R-E channel in Section IV-A, where transmit SNR constraints at both the source and the relay are set to be 10 dB (i.e., SNR 1 = SNR 2 = 10 dB). In Fig. 4 , the secrecy rates achieved by the proposed NNC-based scheme and the benchmark schemes are displayed versus the relay-to-destination channel gain (|h r,d | 2 ), where |h s,r | 2 = 2, and the other channel gains have unit power. As shown in this figure, the proposed scheme, the AF/CJ scheme and the IA scheme achieve the same secrecy rate when |h r,d | 2 ≤ 1, since all these schemes reduce to the CJ scheme in [4] in this case. However, when |h r,d | 2 > 1, the superiority of the proposed scheme is highlighted especially when |h r,d | 2 is large. For example, when |h r,d | 2 = 20, there is a gap of 0.52 BPCU between the secrecy rates achieved by the proposed scheme (1.77 BPCU) and the IA scheme (1.25 BPCU), and the gap between the proposed scheme and the DF scheme or the AF/CJ scheme becomes more larger in this case.
In Fig. 5 , the secrecy rates achieved by the proposed NNCbased scheme and the benchmark schemes versus |h r,d | 2 are displayed for the very strong eavesdropping, where |h s,e | 2 = 11, and the other channel gains have unit power. In this case, the eavesdropping channel is so strong that the main channel is weaker than the noise-corrupted eavesdropping channel as defined in III-C, i.e., C(|h s,d | 2 P 1 ) ≤ C(|h s,e | 2 P 1 /(1 + P 2 )), and obviously the DF, AF/CJ and IA schemes cannot achieve non-zero secrecy rates. However, as shown in Fig. 5 , the proposed scheme can still achieve positive secrecy rates when |h r,d | 2 > 1, since it can enlarge the main channel and suppress the eavesdropping channel simultaneously.
C. Fading R-E Channel
In this subsection, we model the channel gain between nodes α ∈ {s, r } and β ∈ {r, d, e} as distance dependent Rayleigh fading, i.e., h α,β
α,β , where γ is the path loss exponent, d α,β is the distance between nodes α and β, and g α,β denotes the small-scale fading which is a complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., g α,β ∼ CN (0, 1). In addition, we set the path loss exponent γ = 2 reflecting a favorable propagation condition. Each average secrecy rate is obtained by taking average over 10 thousand simulations in order to eliminate the impact of channel randomness. We first consider the network geometry with a fixedly located relay in Figs. 6 and 7, where SNR 1 = SNR 2 = 10 dB. Specifically, for Fig. 6 , the source, the relay, the destination and the eavesdropper are located at the points (0, 0), (d, 0), (1, 0) and (0, 1) in a plane, respectively. Fig. 6 compares the average secrecy rates achieved by the proposed NNC-based scheme and the benchmark schemes versus the value of d. From this figure, one can observe that the DF scheme only performs well when d is small (i.e., the relay is close to the source), but has a very poor performance when d is large. However, the IA scheme and the proposed scheme has a more balanced performance when d is ranged from 0.05 to 2. In addition, the proposed scheme significantly outperforms the IA scheme, especially when d is small or moderate, while performance gap between the two schemes is narrowed when d is large. This is because the proposed NNC-based scheme will reduce to the IA scheme if the source-relay link is sufficiently weak. For Fig. 7 , the eavesdropper is located at (0, 2), which becomes farer to the source, and the locations of the other nodes are the same as those considered for Fig. 6 . observe the secrecy rates of all curves have been improved as the source-eavesdropper channel becomes statistically weaker. Note that the proposed NNC-based scheme has been improved more significantly compared to the benchmark schemes, while the joint upper bound has only been improved slightly, since the upper bound in [34] without the secrecy constraints is independent of the eavesdropping channel. Fig. 8 considers a symmetric network geometry with a randomly located relay, where SNR 1 = 10 dB. Specifically, consider a disc of radius 2 m in which the source is located at its center, i.e., the point (0, 0); the destination and the eavesdropper are located at the points (1, 0) and (0, 1), respectively; whereas the relay is uniformly and randomly located within this disc. Compared to Figs. 6 and 7, the considered network geometry in Fig. 8 is more general and fairer for performance comparison since the possible locations of the relay can uniformly cover the entire disc. Fig. 8 compares the average secrecy rates achieved by the proposed NNC-based scheme and the benchmark schemes versus the transmit SNR constraint at the relay ( SNR 2 ) in dB. As shown in this figure, secrecy rates achieved by all the schemes (expect the direct transmission) increases with SNR 2 , while the DF and the AF/CJ schemes benefit little as SNR 2 increases. However, the secrecy rates achieved by the IA scheme and the proposed scheme steadily increase with SNR 2 at the range from 5 to 30 dB, and a constant gap exists between these two schemes. In addition, the DF scheme does not perform well since there is only a small probability for the relay to be very close to the source.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have focused on the four-node R-E channel, and developed a new closed-form expression of the achievable secrecy rate for such a scenario. The key idea of the proposed scheme is to apply the NNC compression scheme to the R-E channel, where helping interference information is injected into the compression codebook at the relay by simply enlarging the compression rate. Then, the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed scheme was characterized with closed-form expressions for both DM and Gaussian channels, where the optimal compression rate and the optimal transmit power at the relay are determined. The derived achievable secrecy scheme can be viewed as a general framework, which naturally combines the NNC compression relaying scheme with the interference-assisted scheme, and some existing works can be viewed as special cases of the proposed NNC-based secure scheme. In addition, compared to existing schemes, analytic and numerical results have been provided to show that the proposed secure scheme can offer significant performance gains. Interesting future topics could include the extension of the proposed NNC-based secure scheme to the parallel R-E channel, the R-E channel with multiple relays, and the other more novel and complex cooperative secrecy communication networks. Moreover, it also could be an interesting future topic to consider practical designs of the proposed scheme for sure communication.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To upper bound the conditional probability mass function p(l j |l j −1 ) for any j ∈ [1 : B] and l j −1 , l j ∈ [1 : 2 n R 2 ], we first make some useful definitions as follows.
• Given L j −1 = l j −1 , define 2 n R 2 binary random variables as
. Define a new random variable as T l j −1 2 n R 2 k=1 Q k,l j −1 , which represents that there are T l j −1 qualified indexes in the 2 n R 2ŷ r j -codewords. From the joint typicality ( [38] , Lecture Note 2), for sufficiently large n, the probability P(Q k,l j −1 = 1) can be bounded as:
, so it can be bounded as
Similar to the definitions in [38] (Lecture Note 4), we can identify the random variables
, whose distributions depend on L j −1 in the same way as the distributions of L j,l j −1 , Q k,l j −1 and T l j −1 depend on l j −1 . From the encoding process, given L j −1 = l j −1 , conditioned on that there are t (t > 0) qualified indexes and l j is one of them (i.e. Q l j ,l j −1 = 1), obviously we have
Similarly, given L j −1 = l j −1 , we can obtain another conditional probability as
which is assumed to be an integer without loss of generality, then the probability p(l j |l j −1 ) can be calculated as
The first term in the above equation can be bounded as
where (a) is based on the multiplicative form of Chernoff bound [39, eq. (7)] by setting the relative error as 1 2 . Besides, the second term can be upper bounded as
where (a) is based on (46) and (47) 
for all j ∈ [1 : B]. The eavesdropper make an error if there exists none or more than one such index set. Analysis of the error probability: Given W 1 = w 1 and L B = l B , assume without loss of generality that W 1 = 1 and L 1 = · · · = L B = 1 are sent. Then the eavesdropper makes an error only if at least one of the following events occur:
for all j for some l B−1 , w
Let ε denote the error decoding event at the eavesdropper. Then λ(w 1 , l B ) can be expressed as λ(w 1 , l B ) = P(ε) and the error probability can be bounded as
From [35] , one can see that the first three terms goes to 0 as n → ∞ since we have constrained the rate pair (R 2 , R 1,d ) in (13) and (14) . For P(ε 4 ), define the events
}, and then 
where (a) is due to the fact that the codebook at each block j ∈ [1 : b] is independently generated and the memoryless channel is considered. Note that if w 1 = 1 and l j −1 = 1, (X 2 j (l j −1 ),Ŷ r j (l j |l j −1 )) ∼ n i=1 p X 2 ,Ŷ r (x 2,( j −1)n+i ,ŷ r,( j −1)n+i ) is independent of (X 1 j (w 1 , 1 
Therefore, the error probability P(ε) goes to 0 if n is sufficiently large. This lemma has been proved.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Based on the coding scheme in Appendix III-D, C 1 and C 2 are generated by letting the joint distribution of (X 1 , X 2 ,Ŷ r ) as: X 1 ∼ N (0, P 1 ), X 2 ∼ N (0, P 2 ),Ŷ r = Y r + Z C where Z C ∼ N (0, δ C ) and Z C is independent of any other variable.
From (4), for a given power pair (P 1 , P 2 ), R
1 (R 2 , δ C ) and R (2) 1 (R 2 , δ C ) can be calculated as shown in (56) and (57), respectively, at the top of the this page. Here we set δ C = δ * C 1+(1+c) P 1 b P 2 , which is motivated by the fact that this choice can maximize the R (1) 1 if R 2 = I 1 . Now, we will first prove R I I S in Theorem 2 to be achieved. In particular, we set R 2 = R * 2 , where R * 2 is defined in Lemma 1, which can be calculated as R * 2 = max C 
and R
1 (R * 2 , δ * C ) = C a P 1 1+P 2 can be obtained. LEMMA 4 In the next, we will consider three cases corresponding to the values of (a, b, c, P 1 ).
1) When b ≥
1) When b ≥ 1 + (1 + c)P 1 : R I I s = C P 1 + bc P 1 P 2 1+(1+c) P 1 +b P 2 − C a P 1 1+P 2 , and thus it is not difficult to find that R I I s increase with P 2 . P * 2 =P 2 can be obtained.
2) When 1 ≤ b < 1 + (1 + c)P 1 : R I I s = C (P 1 + b P 2 ) − C (a P 1 + P 2 ), whose derivation is
. 
